Corporate or Governmental Duties?: Corporate Citizenship From a Governmental Perspective by Aßländer, Michael S. & Curbach, Janina
 
 
 
 
 
Dieses Dokument ist eine Zweitveröffentlichung (Verlagsversion) / 
This is a self-archiving document (published version):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diese Version ist verfügbar / This version is available on:  
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa2-354384 
 
 
 
„Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFGgeförderten) Allianz- bzw. 
Nationallizenz frei zugänglich.“ 
 
This publication is openly accessible with the permission of the copyright owner. The permission is 
granted within a nationwide license, supported by the German Research Foundation (abbr. in German 
DFG). 
www.nationallizenzen.de/ 
 
 
 
Michael S. Aßländer, Janina Curbach  
Corporate or Governmental Duties? Corporate Citizenship From a 
Governmental Perspective 
 
Erstveröffentlichung in / First published in: 
Business & Society. 2017, 56(4), S. 617 – 645 [Zugriff am: 14.08.2019]. SAGE journals. ISSN 1552-
4205. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650315585974  
 
 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650315585974
Business & Society
2017, Vol. 56(4) 617 –645
© The Author(s) 2015
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav 
DOI: 10.1 77/00 7650315 859
journals.sagepub.com/home/bas
Article
Corporate or 
Governmental Duties? 
Corporate Citizenship 
From a Governmental 
Perspective
Michael S. Aßländer1 and Janina Curbach2
Abstract
Recent discussions on corporate citizenship (CC) highlight the new 
political role of corporations in society by arguing that corporations 
increasingly act as quasi-governmental actors and take on what hitherto had 
originally been governmental tasks. By examining political and sociological 
citizenship theories, the authors show that such a corporate engagement 
can be explained by a changing (self-)conception of corporate citizens from 
corporate bourgeois to corporate citoyen. As an intermediate actor in 
society, the corporate citoyen assumes co-responsibilities for social and civic 
affairs and actively collaborates with fellow citizens beyond governmental 
regulation. This change raises the question of how such corporate civic 
engagement can be aligned with public policy regulations and how corporate 
activities can be integrated into the democratic regime. To clarify the mode 
of CC contributions to society, the authors will apply the tenet of subsidiarity 
as a governing principle which allows for specifying corporations’ tasks as 
intermediate actors in society. By referring to the renewed European Union 
strategy for Corporate Social Responsibility, the authors show how such a 
subsidiary corporate-governmental task-sharing can be organized.
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During the last years, the political perspective of corporate activities has 
increasingly gained attention in academic discussion, and a whole variety of 
new conceptions has been developed. Labels like “Political CSR” (Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2007), “Business Citizenship” (Logsdon & Wood, 2001, 2002), 
“Corporate Global Citizenship” (Waddock & Smith, 2000), or “Corporate 
Citizenship” (Matten & Crane, 2005; Matten, Crane, & Chapple, 2003) try to 
emphasize the new role of corporations as political actors. However, the vari-
ety of approaches and the often insufficient delineation among these concep-
tions make it difficult to define clear boundaries of this new research area. 
While the authors agree with Wood and Logsdon (2008) that “defining cor-
porate citizenship and corporate social responsibility is a single debate, not 
two” (p. 52), we believe that the corporate citizenship (CC) debate widens the 
scope of corporate social responsibility (CSR) by pointing to the role of cor-
porations as political actors and the concomitant (new) responsibilities. And 
even if Crane, Matten, and Moon (2008) believe that CC for most scholars 
has “no particular significance or meaning” (p. 22), we will use the term CC 
in the following exactly to focus on its political dimension.
The factual involvement of corporations in providing public goods also 
poses new problems for governments and challenges the established order of 
political governance because it requires new forms of corporate-governmen-
tal collaboration. While most scholars stress the new role of corporations as 
political actors which (voluntarily) contribute to society beyond their regular 
business, in recent discussion, less attention has been paid to the problem of 
how such efforts can be integrated in the broader political context from a 
governmental perspective.
Thus, for example, Crane, Matten, and Moon have argued for an extended 
theoretical conceptualization of CC (Matten & Crane, 2005; Matten et al., 
2003). Based on the observation that corporations have started to administer 
civic rights voluntarily in cases where national governments fail or are unable 
to do so, they see corporations as quasi-governmental actors and assign to 
them the status as members of a “surrogate citizenry” (Matten & Crane, 
2005; Moon, Crane, & Matten, 2005). But this new definition by Crane, 
Matten, and Moon still remains rather vague, and it deals with two very dif-
ferent citizenship understandings. On one hand, corporations become citizens 
because they are bestowed with specific citizenship rights by national law. 
On the other hand, they are seen as citizens because they themselves are the 
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guarantor of citizenship rights to others. And even more importantly, if cor-
porations act as quasi-governmental actors and provide civic rights in com-
munities, it remains unclear whether such engagement should be seen as a 
voluntary discretionary engagement, terminable at any time for any reason, 
or as an obligation resulting from corporate citizenry.
In this article, the authors will discuss these challenges of CC (research) 
from a political point of view. Therefore, the article will contribute to the debate 
on CC by answering two fundamental questions: (a) How should CC be defined 
and conceived of in a globalizing economy? (b) Which responsibilities can be 
assigned to corporate citizens and what kind of governance principles should 
be applied to organize governmental-corporate task-sharing?
Addressing the first question of the status of CC in globalizing economy, 
we will start our argument with some historical sketches of the different con-
ceptions of citizens as bourgeois and citoyen and with looking at the key 
principles to be found in citizenship research. Based on this examination, we 
will discuss the new idea of corporations as citizens and argue that a proper 
conception of corporations as citizens has also to distinguish between two 
different corporate citizen roles: the corporate bourgeois and the corporate 
citoyen.
To answer the second question concerning adequate governance arrange-
ments, in the subsequent section we will follow Aßländer (2011, 2012) and 
introduce the tenet of subsidiarity as a governance principle which would 
allow for clarifying the social (co)responsibilities of the corporate citoyen in 
the context of governmental-corporate task-sharing. To illustrate what such 
subsidiary co-responsibility would mean in the context of political gover-
nance, we will then discuss the necessity of such a new governance principle 
by referring to the new CSR strategy of the European Union (EU). The 
authors will argue that even under the conditions of globalizing societies, 
governments may see corporations as intermediate actors bearing specific 
subsidiary co-responsibilities in society. However, this visualization means 
that governments have to develop governance structures, which are capable 
to cope with this new role of corporations as political actors.
Bourgeois or Citoyen—The Status of the Citizen
Although the idea of citizenship in the sense of belonging to a specific polity 
reaches back to the Greek polis and the Roman empire, the modern “idea” of 
citizenship was derived from philosophical enlightenment. On one hand, it is 
based on the concept of the nation-state that possesses sovereignty and has 
the power to regulate the affairs of its citizens (Hegel, 1998, §§ 260-340; 
Kant, 2006, §§ 43-61; see also Hirst & Thompson, 1995; Hirst, Thompson, & 
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Bromley, 2009, pp. 220-225). On the other hand, it is based on the assump-
tion of social contract theory, imagining that “society” is constituted by a 
voluntary contract among its members (Hobbes, 2003; Locke, 1952; 
Rousseau, 1998). By consenting to a hypothetical contract, people establish 
political government, acknowledge its supremacy, establish legal security by 
subordinating under the same rules, and thus constitute the sphere of the civil 
law making them equal members in the society, that is, citizens (Fichte, 2009, 
II,3, § 1). Over time, this idea of a social contract among (hypothetically) 
equal associates has increasingly replaced the medieval imagination of peo-
ple as subjects of a prince by Grace of God. From this new perspective, soci-
ety has been seen as a voluntary association which is regulated by a contract 
among its members, constituting their citizenry and describing their rights 
and duties as citizens.
Notably, for Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the act of association of all individuals 
and their subordination under a general will (volonté général) forms a moral 
and collective body in which the individual is sovereign and subject at the same 
time (Rousseau, 1998, pp. 14-16). Based on this idea, Rousseau in his famous 
Social Contract delineates two types of citizens—bourgeois and citoyen. While 
the burgess (bourgeois) is defined by his settlement (town) and remains the 
subject of an outside authority, the citizen (citoyen) is member of a political 
community forming the state (city, polis) by participating in the political deci-
sion-making process (Rousseau, 1998, p. 15, footnote). This definition of the 
citoyen being sovereign and subject at the same time has become a cornerstone 
for political thinking in enlightened philosophy. In his Principles of Political 
Right, Immanuel Kant (1891) draws on this idea when arguing that the civil 
state is constituted by three “rational principles” (p. 35) which are (a) the liberty 
of every member of the society, as a man; (b) the equality of every member of 
the society with every other, as a subject (bourgeois); and (c) the self-depen-
dency of every member of the commonwealth, as a citizen (citoyen). It should 
be noticed at this point that for Rousseau as well as for Kant, the definition of 
the citizen as bourgeois or citoyen was not seen as a contradiction or a question 
of either/or. Rather this distinction mirrored the double nature of citizenship 
reflecting two political aspects of citizenry (Aßländer & Curbach, 2014).
With the early writings of Karl Marx, this primarily political perspective 
of the citizen as bourgeois and citoyen has been re-interpreted. Marx adopts 
the terms of bourgeois and citoyen, but re-defines them for differentiating 
the spheres of private (economic) and political life (Cohen & Arato, 1992, 
pp. 304-305). While the bourgeois lives an egoistic private life, solely inter-
ested in his own affairs and regarding other men just as a means for his own 
purposes, the citoyen is defined as a member of the political community 
considering himself a communal being (Marx, 1975, p. 154). The 
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characterization of the bourgeois as “economic citizen” has been commonly 
accepted not only by Marxists. Latest with the writings of Werner Sombart 
(1987), one of the most influential German economists of the fin de siècle, 
the bourgeois was by definition perceived as a member of a specific class, 
the commercial society, solely defined by his “commercial spirit.” For Marx 
and his successors, the distinction between bourgeois and citoyen no longer 
reflects two political aspects of citizenship but signifies two separate spheres 
of citizen’s life—as bourgeois he is individual and interested primarily in his 
private (economic) affairs; as citoyen he is part of the community and inter-
ested in the public affairs and political participation. However, as Otfried 
Höffe (2007) states, in “real life both occur at the same time and, possibly, 
in the same person: those with a strong individual profile see societal com-
mitment as an integral part of their personal character” (p. 147).
These developments in the philosophical understanding of citizenship 
mirror the historical and political changes and are also reflected in political 
theory. In the aftermath of the French revolution and with the rise of the 
nation-state, citizenship has become the privileged status of equal individuals 
who belong to the same “societal community” which in turn is confined to a 
national territory and governed by the rule of national law. From this point of 
view, the nation-state is defined as a self-sufficient entity, solely dependent 
on the recognition of its sovereignty by the other nation-states (Hirst & 
Thompson, 1995). At the same time, the nation-state becomes the sole grantor 
of civic rights and the concomitant privileges. Thus, the social status as citi-
zen allows individuals to enjoy a set of unalienable rights on one hand, but 
consists also of some obligations on the other (Bobbio, 1987).
Nowadays, it is exactly this idea of a closed and homogeneous societal com-
munity of fellow citizens within a national territory, which is challenged by 
globalizing economies. The weakening of national governments’ authority, 
new transnational forms of civil society activities, and significant cross-border 
migration flows (Canovan, 2009, pp. 156-158; Keck & Sikkink, 1998, 
pp. 35-37) have challenged the traditional understanding of nation-states based 
on a commonly shared culture. Nation-states are exposed to different trans-, 
sub-, and supra-national forces like markets and civil society, and have lost their 
function to be “a locus of democratic collective action” (Warren, 2009, p. 175).
Principles of CC
To clarify what citizenship could mean in the corporate context and against 
the background of globalizing societies, it is fruitful to look at different con-
ceptions of citizenship as they are used as a point of departure in the recent 
CC debate.
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In a widely discussed contribution, Néron and Norman (2008) note that 
the conception of citizenship can be based on one or more of the following 
four ideas. (a) Citizenship can be defined as legal status; this definition 
means that citizenship describes a kind of membership in a political commu-
nity, typically a nation-state, accompanied by a set of citizenship rights and 
duties. (b) Citizenship can be based on the idea of political identity; seen 
from this view citizenship denotes the identification of the citizen with his 
community. This citizenship understanding allows for differentiating two 
identities of the citizen—the citizen as private person and the citizen as mem-
ber of a community. (c) Citizenship can be rooted in the idea that citizenship 
serves as locus of solidarity; thus, citizenship focuses on the solidarity among 
fellow citizens and describes citizenship in its function of social cohesion. (d) 
The last way to conceive of citizenship depicts citizenship as virtuous activity 
aiming at the self-governing of a community. Hence, civic virtues are seen as 
motivating force that drives citizens actively and responsibly to engage for 
the common good. On one hand, citizenship as a legal status reflects the idea 
of the bourgeois as subject of an external authority bestowed with specific 
rights but not actively participating in the political decision-making. On the 
other hand, citizenship as political identity, as locus of solidarity and as virtu-
ous activity, mirrors a political understanding of citizenship underpinning the 
active participation of the citizen in his respective society.
Wood and Logsdon (2002) approach the citizenship term from a different 
angle, referring to the work of Geraint Parry. The authors delineate three 
contemporary understandings of citizenship. In the minimalist view, citizens 
are seen as residents under a common jurisdiction which strive for personal 
goals within the legal boundaries. From a communitarian perspective citizen-
ship consists of rights and duties against the polity. Individual liberty in this 
conception is not seen as a value for its own sake but is in tension with the 
expected individual contributions to the common good. From a universal 
human rights perspective, citizenship rights derive from natural law and are 
seen as a precondition of human agency. Thus, it becomes the task of the 
government to secure those rights. It is worth noting that Wood and Logsdon 
(2002) see no fundamental differences between the minimalist and the uni-
versal human rights perspective which are “united in their support of human 
autonomy and extensive fundamental rights” (p. 72).
Similarly, Cohen (1999) describes three components defining the full citi-
zenship status in modern societies—citizenship as juridical status of legal per-
sonhood, citizenship as a political principle of democracy, and citizenship as a 
form of membership. Thereby, the understanding of citizenship as legal person-
hood is based on the universalistic idea of natural law (Höffe, 2007, p. 167) 
and built on a juridical perception of citizenship that emphasizes that, as 
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a legal person, every citizen has freedom and rights protected by law and 
“can sue in court and invoke a law that grants him rights” (Cohen, 1999, 
p. 249). Quite differently, citizenship as a political principle of democracy is 
a model that is rooted in the political tradition of Aristotle and the idea of the 
Greek polis and ensues from republican tradition in which citizenship is 
defined as an “activity that involves participation in ruling and being ruled by 
equals who have uniform political status” (Cohen, 1999, p. 248; see Aristotle, 
2009, p. 117 [1283b]). According to this republican conception of society, the 
citizen himself is both author of the laws and bound by his rules and thus 
sovereign and subject at the same time and therefore has to consider “the 
common good as well as particular interests” simultaneously (Cohen, 1999, 
p. 248; see also Stokes, 2009, pp. 31-34). As a form of membership citizen-
ship is bound to the membership in a specific community as the key prereq-
uisite for the enjoyment of any social status. This membership also creates 
“social closure”: the exclusion of those that do not belong to the respective 
social community of citizens (Brubaker, 1992, pp. 21-34; Canovan, 2009, 
pp. 156-158). Table 1 provides an overview of the different conceptions 
of citizenship.
To some extent, these analyses of citizenship correspond to the above 
mentioned role models of the bourgeois and the citoyen. As pointed out by 
Rousseau and Marx, both roles of the citizen—as private as well as political 
being—are inextricably bind together. It is exactly this double nature of the 
citizen in the republican understanding of citizenship, which Scherer, Palazzo, 
and Baumann (2006) contrast with the liberal understanding of citizenry. 
With reference to Habermas’s considerations on political theory, they con-
clude, “In contrast to the liberal model of society, in the republican model the 
citizen has a double role as a private citizen (‘bourgeois’) and as a citizen of 
a state or a community (‘citoyen’)” (Scherer et al., 2006, p. 515). In the clas-
sical conceptions, both roles of the citizen are defined based on the citizen 
being part of either a nation-state, which guarantees legal protection, or by 
belonging to a well-defined community with rules and laws that the citizen 
has to comply with. However, Cohen asserts that “citizenship” in globalizing 
societies can be defined as membership and ties of solidarity within different 
groups sharing culture, values, or identity.
Such a cosmopolitan view on citizenship raises at least two problems. 
First, as Néron and Norman (2008) point out, such different belongings might 
cause conflicts because an individual’s identity as citizen competes with his 
private individualistic interests or with his sense of membership in other 
political communities or identity groups. Second, the lack of clear boundaries 
of social belonging, accompanied by only loosely defined rights and duties, 
might lead to what Hirst et al. (2009) call a “durable disorder” (p. 12). 
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Table 1. Corporate Citizenship as Societal Status.
Corporate 
citizenship 
status
Basic ideas  
of citizenship (Néron  
& Norman, 2008)
Current views of 
citizenship (Wood & 
Logsdon, 2002)
Citizenship  
principle  
(Cohen, 1999)
Liberal and republican model 
of citizenship (Scherer, 
Palazzo, & Baumann, 2006)
Corporate  
citizenship 
understanding
Bourgeois 
(economic 
citizenship)
Legal status: Citizens 
are defined by law and 
bestowed with citizen 
rights which distinguish 
citizens from non-citizens
Minimalist/universal 
view: Citizens as 
bearers of rights which 
are either bestowed 
by community or by 
natural law
Legal personhood: 
Citizens as bearers 
of rights which 
are universal but 
protected by 
national law
Liberal model: Citizens 
act under the law; 
governments possess 
regulatory authority
Corporation as legal 
entity bestowed with 
specific rights by law
Citoyen 
(political 
and civil 
citizenship)
Virtuous activity: Citizen 
takes part in the 
self-governing of his 
political community and 
contributes actively to 
the common good
Communitarian view: 
Citizen as member 
of polity is obliged 
to contribute to the 
common good
Political participation: 
Citizen is sovereign 
and subject in 
political community 
and civil society
Republican model: Citizen as 
political actor contributes 
to the peaceful stabilization 
of society
Corporations as 
bearers of political 
rights participating in 
self-governing (e.g., 
soft law)
Full citizenship 
(member 
in social 
community)
Political identity/locus 
of solidarity: Citizens 
identify with communities 
they live in and develop 
ties of solidarity
Membership: Citizen 
as member of a 
societal community 
beyond his 
territorial belonging
Corporations define 
ties of solidarity 
either by territorial 
belonging and/or 
industrial membership
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Because a clear criterion of belonging is missing and “groups within national 
states grow in significance as alternative focuses of allegiance for their mem-
bers” (Hirst et al., 2009, p. 226), this condition leads to a lack of identifica-
tion with the nation-state and to a reduction of collective endeavors (see also 
Höffe, 2007, p. 149).
Such durable disorder, caused by different belongings and the identifica-
tion with various communities, makes it difficult to transfer the idea of politi-
cal citizenship to corporations. Multinational corporations act in different 
countries and can hardly be described in terms of citizenship as belonging to 
one single nation-state. The economic activities of multinational corporations 
are regulated by national and international legal norms. In contrast to that, the 
political activities of such corporations are not embedded in a similar frame-
work of national and international regulations. To develop our idea of CC 
further, the authors will now transfer these different ideas of economic and 
political citizenry to the corporate context.
Two Spheres of Corporate Citizenry—Corporate 
Bourgeois and Corporate Citoyen
As it originated in the 19th century, the modern type of corporation is a child 
of the bourgeois society and is invested with a specific “identity” and a “legal 
personhood” (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2005). Created as a legal person 
by its own a company is distinct from its owners, managers, and employees, 
it is able to possess private properties, it is capable to sue and being sued in 
court (even by its own shareholders), and it receives legal protection (Lower, 
2010, pp. 74-75). Corporations are designed to be economic citizens whose 
main purpose is to succeed in the marketplace and to generate profits on 
behalf of the companies’ owners. Thus, corporations are granted legal per-
sonhood status as bourgeois (Aßländer & Curbach, 2014). As corporate bour-
geois, the corporation is a full member of the economic sphere and the private 
sector, and therefore enjoys the freedom to follow its own self-serving eco-
nomic interests within legal boundaries. “Any reference to ‘social good’ was 
at best symbolic and derivative in that the economic function provided the 
social good” (Banerjee, 2007, p. 10). Like the individual bourgeois, the cor-
porate bourgeois is subject of a sovereign which is external to his own eco-
nomic scopes and provides and warrants the rules of law and grants the status 
of citizenship by national legislation. Because the corporate bourgeois is 
solely interested in economic success, also all his activities aiming at the bet-
terment of societal welfare will ultimately be instrumental and solely serve in 
his (legitimate) economic interest. As Logsdon and Wood (2002) point out, in 
such minimalistic conception of citizenship corporations would only “claim 
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those rights essential to the pursuit of self-interest and would fulfill only 
those obligations mandated by the convenience of having a collective entity 
to guarantee those rights” (p. 162).
Although corporations are primarily “economic constructs,” during the 
last decades especially, multinational corporations have started to engage in 
the political sphere not only by fostering civil society activities but also by 
assisting in public–private partnerships aiming at the betterment of the 
social and environmental conditions of the communities within which they 
operate. For example, multinationals define social and environmental stan-
dards in their supply chain; promote political, human, and labor rights in 
their host countries; or initiate stakeholder dialogues with different groups 
of civil society. These activities show that corporations have started to 
engage in political discourse and to participate in the process of rule-mak-
ing. As corporate citoyen, companies have developed what Höffe (2007) 
calls a “benevolent civic sense” or “sense of community” (p. 147). The 
increasing engagement of corporate actors in initiatives like the Responsible 
Care Program of the chemical industry or the Caux Round Table, aiming at 
defining “soft law” standards of responsible business behavior, shows this 
changing self-conception of corporations and exemplifies how the corpo-
rate citoyen becomes both “legislator” and “subject” of his own rules (Crane 
et al., 2008, p. 70). Even if initiatives like Responsible Care occasionally 
have been criticized due to its too weak control mechanisms and too oppor-
tunistic regulations (King & Lenox, 2000), they also may be considered as 
first tentative steps to more effective mechanisms of industry-wide self-
regulation. Although corporations have always tried to influence policy, 
such a “politicization of the corporation” (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 
p. 1115) shows a new quality because it is increasingly legitimized through 
partnerships with international institutions and civil society organizations 
(Zadek, 2001, p. 99).
However, this new development is only partially mirrored in the sphere of 
political governance. While the role of the corporate bourgeois is well defined 
by national and international law, the new role of the corporate citoyen is only 
addressed superficially. Most governmental laws and international regula-
tions concern the status of corporations as a legal entity within the economic 
sphere. Thus, regulations like the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) or the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) aim at guaranteeing legal protection and legal certainty 
under international law. Only few regulations focus on the political aspect of 
corporate activities. First attempts have been made with the initiation of the 
UN Global Compact that expects corporations to contribute to the resolution 
of societal and ecological problems. However, the Global Compact does not 
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provide any normative rationale or at least clear regulations for how such 
corporate political activities should be dealt with from a governmental per-
spective. Notably, in globalizing societies the integration of corporate politi-
cal responsibilities in the process of political governance remains one of the 
most challenging problems. Especially when corporate responsibilities “are 
entangled with state obligations, it makes it difficult if not impossible to tell 
who is responsible for what in practice” (Ruggie, 2008, p. 190).
Thus, bestowing corporations with a political CC status is not without 
problems. Apart from the question whether corporations have the competen-
cies and capabilities to address global societal problems, such corporate 
activities are in fact neither legitimated nor controlled by any democratically 
constituted political demos. Despite the fact that we have an academic and 
political debate about the role of corporations as political actors, this debate 
is not mirrored by concepts of political governance which would allow for 
accommodating this new political role of corporations. Although Matten and 
Crane (2005) state that in cases of governmental failures “society can only be 
happy if corporations fill this gap,” this conclusion at least partly misses the 
point (p. 175). Even if laudable, CC engagement remains dependent on a 
public consent and must be governed and controlled by public instances 
(Scherer et al., 2006). Even Matten and Crane see this point of lacking demo-
cratic legitimization, demanding that corporations when taking over govern-
mental functions “should take over to the same degree exactly the type of 
accountability which modern societies demand from government . . .” 
(Matten et al., 2003, p. 118). Thus, if corporations start with providing civic 
rights and social services for other citizens, political regulation is needed to 
ensure that those services are in line with society’s expectations and will be 
democratically legitimized.
There is empirical evidence that such a double nature of the citizen is not 
a purely theoretical assumption. Multinational corporations have started to 
bind ties of solidarity with various local communities where they operate, 
engaging, for example, for combating AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa or initiat-
ing educational programs in South America (Hsieh, 2009). For example, the 
German sportswear manufacturer Puma has initiated various programs that 
go beyond its immediate and mediate business interests. Within the so-called 
“Puma Vision” agenda, the company has defined three subprograms “Puma 
Safe” concerning environmental and social standards of its production, 
“Puma Peace” aiming at fostering the peace campaigns and initiatives in 
Africa, and “Puma Creative” dedicated to the benefit of young artists and 
film-makers (Puma, 2012). Such engagement for peaceful coexistence or 
artistic freedom exceeds the boundaries of the immediate business interests 
of the corporate bourgeois and actively contributes to a better society.
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Still, such factual citizenship engagement and the self-definition of 
belonging do not hide the fact that also in these cases, the question of govern-
mental-corporate task-sharing remains open. If corporations can be seen as 
cosmopolitan corporate citoyens contributing to society beyond their eco-
nomic activities, a governance principle is needed that would allow for 
assigning the concrete co-responsibilities of the corporate citoyen.
Subsidiarity and Corporate Co-Responsibilities
While the discussion of the political rights and responsibilities of the indi-
vidual citoyen has a long tradition in sociology and political philosophy, the 
rights and duties of the corporate citizen remain unspecified, especially from 
the political perspective. On one hand, nowadays governments and society 
expect an additional contribution of companies to solve environmental and 
societal problems. On the other hand, even in most theoretical contributions, 
it seems to remain up to the companies whether, in which field and to what 
extent, they want to contribute to the common good.
To clarify the new role of the corporate citoyen, the authors argue that cor-
porations have to be seen as intermediate actors in society bearing a subsidiary 
co-responsibility (Aßländer, 2011, 2012; Lower, 2010, p. 72). From this per-
spective, governments have to develop governance structures that allow for 
embedding corporate civic engagement in the broader context of national or 
international policy-making and guarantee governmental supervision.
Originally, the tenet of subsidiarity is derived from natural law and 
describes a fair and just task-sharing among the different layers in society. 
It states that in society, no task should be assigned to a higher level of 
authority if it can be accomplished by a lesser and subordinate entity. As a 
principle of political governance, the principle of subsidiarity defines the 
relationship between political entities of higher and lower order, as between 
the European Community and its member states (Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Article 5). In the social 
context, this narrow scope is broadened and subsidiarity is seen as a norm 
for defining a fair task-sharing among governmental and private actors 
within civil society. Although the principle in this form was first formulated 
by Catholic Social Teaching (Pius XI, 1931, § 79), it is as well rooted in the 
Aristotelian tradition of political thinking and has also been discussed in 
Lutheran theology (Finnis, 2011, p. 159; Føllesdal, 1998; Höffe, 1997). 
Thus, the idea of subsidiarity is neither specifically German nor catholic. 
Referring to the American tradition reaching back to the Jacksonian era, 
Fort (1996) points out that the adoption of social responsibilities by corpo-
rations (controlled by governmental supervision) was based on the belief 
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that by taking on such subsidiary co-responsibilities, corporations would 
both pursue their own interests and benefit the common good at the same 
time. As Lower (2010) puts it, corporations as intermediate actors in soci-
ety “could be among the non-state actors helping states to exercise public 
powers” (p. 187).
As a coordinating principle for the collaboration of the various levels of 
society, subsidiarity works in two ways. On one hand, it defends the subor-
dinate entities from illegitimate overregulation of higher societal or politi-
cal instances if they can regulate their affairs themselves. On the other 
hand, it constitutes a right of assistance of higher order instances if solving 
their problems is out of reach for the subordinate entities (von Nell-
Breuning, 1964, p. 8; von Nell-Breuning, 1968, pp. 60-61). Furthermore, as 
Gosepath (2005) points out, the assignment of responsibilities according to 
the principle of subsidiarity also defends the higher instances in society—
namely, the government—from being overburdened by solving societal or 
regulatory problems, which could be solved on a lower societal level as 
well. Thus, in general, the tenet of subsidiarity is based on the idea of “help-
ing others to help themselves” (Gosepath, 2005, p. 162). Hence, as Carozza 
(2003) puts it, “Subsidiarity is therefore a somewhat paradoxical principle. 
It limits intervention, yet requires it. It expresses both a positive and a nega-
tive vision of the role of the state with respect to society and the individual” 
(p. 44).
However, as a governance principle, subsidiarity thus constitutes a prior-
ity rule, which gives smaller entities precedence over higher instances. This 
idea is justified by the principles of individual autonomy and self-determina-
tion of all citizens. It is based on the precept of personal responsibility, which 
obliges individuals to bear the consequences of their autonomous actions and 
not to shift the burdens of their individual decision to the community. Only in 
cases where the person in need lacks the means or capabilities to escape from 
her misery the community has a general moral obligation to assist (Gosepath, 
2005, pp. 163-164).
Following this line of thought, community is not primarily defined by a 
government or nation-state, but is described as different layers in society 
including single individuals at the bottom as well as institutions on the inter-
mediate and the top level. Hence, subsidiarity defines a task-specific hierar-
chy that is not necessarily bound by a national territory but can also be defined 
by functional competencies (Føllesdal, 1998; Gosepath, 2005, p. 168). Within 
this context, intermediate instances are either defined as a result of the factual 
social development of societies—such as social institutions like family or 
religious communities—or introduced on the basis of contract theory assum-
ing that the neediness of the individuals leads to associations which would 
630 Business & Society 56(4)
allow the associates to solve their problems beyond nation-state regulations 
on a neighborhood or communal level (Gosepath, 2005, pp. 165-166; Lower, 
2010, p. 85).
As a steering principle, subsidiarity was discussed in early German politi-
cal theories. In his 1914 book Allgemeine Staatslehre (General Theory of the 
State), Jellinek describes the subsidiary relation between individuals and 
community shaped by natural law. In his opinion, government should take on 
responsibilities only and insofar as things could not be accomplished by the 
citizens or sub-state associations. In these cases, for assisting lower instances, 
the state can either create the conditions to foster private engagement or 
accomplish the respective tasks on its own (Jellinek, 1914, pp. 259-260).
However, subsidiarity is not to be seen as a purely autocratic principle, by 
which state authorities shift responsibilities to lower instances. Subsidiarity 
regulates the assignment of responsibilities both bottom-up and top-down. 
On one hand, it describes the assignment of societal responsibilities to lower 
levels of society by a central government. But on the other hand, it is also 
seen as an organizing principle, which regulates the assignment of responsi-
bilities from the bottom-up. If organizations and associations of the lowest 
level cannot accomplish societal tasks in a more efficient manner, it is a pre-
cept of rationality to shift such tasks to the next higher level and vice versa. 
This rationality is especially true if centralized institutions can reduce costs 
because of economics of scale or if exceeding externalities overcharge the 
capacities of lower level instances (Ederveen, Gelauff, & Palkmans, 2008, 
pp. 23-24).
However, efficiency and cost-reduction are only second-order arguments 
for applying subsidiarity as governance principle. As a principle of political 
ethics, subsidiarity strictly refers to the tenet of justice (Finnis, 2011, p. 146; 
Höffe, 2007, p. 88). This reference means that subsidiarity grants legitimacy 
to the state accepting it as superior authority, but at the same time it restricts 
governmental competencies because it sees the individual as the ultimate 
decision-making body (Gosepath, 2005, p. 163; Höffe, 2007, p. 85). Thus, it 
creates an individual right and an individual duty to act autonomously and 
self-responsibly (Finnis, 2011, p. 169).
As a principle of political governance, subsidiarity imposes the obligation 
on governments to solve three key problems. First, governments have to clar-
ify to which extent and in which areas they want to allow contributions of 
subordinate level actors. Second, if such areas are defined, governments have 
to decide upon whether the existing efforts of the lower instances suffice to 
accomplish the respective tasks at the expected level. Third, if they do not 
suffice, governments have to decide whether the incentives for private 
engagement should be enhanced or whether the respective tasks should be 
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accomplished by governmental authorities’ engagement because lower enti-
ties have failed or are unable to meet the expectations. This decision imposes 
the obligation to governments to define clearly in which field and to which 
extent intermediate activities are mandatory, expected, or tolerated and in 
which areas state intervention is inevitable.
Gosepath (2005) supposes that “the principle of subsidiarity alone cannot 
solve all problems around the distribution of competencies” (p. 169). 
Likewise, Höffe (2007) warns that subsidiarity is only a supple principle 
which “depends on additional considerations about material requirements 
and side constraints” and therefore “does not set out any precise recommen-
dation as how to proceed” (p. 92). Nonetheless Höffe offers some reference 
points for the assignment of responsibilities. Notably, in cases where the state 
government has to fulfill a democracy-enhancing or a freedom-promoting 
function, state regulation is vital (Höffe, 2007, p. 91). If the assignment of 
responsibilities to lower level entities would violate superior principles of 
justice, such as equal treatment of citizens, or would endanger fundamental 
citizen rights, such as political participation, state intervention is necessary. 
Furthermore, if the issues at stake require strict coordination, such as fighting 
epidemic diseases, state authorities have to intervene.
To cope with the challenges of globalization, Höffe proposes to widen the 
scope of subsidiarity on a horizontal level. This proposal means that interme-
diate instances which assume the individuals’ interests may include not only 
sub-state associations but also new transnational forms of collaboration 
(Höffe, 2007, p. 90). Based on the idea of the corporate citoyen as intermedi-
ate actor in society, we will now discuss the tenet of subsidiarity as a principle 
of political governance in the context of governmental-corporate task-sharing 
and against the background of globalizing economies.
Subsidiarity as Governance Principle in the Age of 
Globalization
During the last two decades, globalization has become
a fashionable concept in the social sciences . . . and a catch-phrase for journalists 
and politicians of every stripe. It is widely asserted that we live in an era in 
which the greater part of social life is determined by global processes, in which 
national cultures, national economies, national borders and national territories 
are dissolving. (Hirst et al., 2009, p. 2)
In the “borderless world” (Ohmae, 1999) of globalization, transnational 
companies seem to be able to escape from nation-state regulations and shift 
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production to countries with less elaborate governmental regulations. Due to 
new information technologies, capital and investment are no longer bound 
to national territories and can be moved quickly from one place on the earth 
to another. Kenichi Ohmae (2005), one of the most prominent visionary of 
globalization, paints the picture of the “homeless company” no longer based 
in a national community and liable solely to the international capital market 
and its global consumers (pp. 18-24; see also Brunkhorst, 2005, p. 132). In a 
globalizing economy, traditional ties of (national) solidarity become ques-
tionable (Habermas, 1998, pp. 74-75), and domestic policy is increasingly 
incapable of regulating (international) markets and solving (global) societal 
and economic problems because the national level is permeated and trans-
formed by the transnational (Hirst & Thompson, 1992).
As a consequence, the power of nation-states has increasingly shifted not 
only to intergovernmental bodies like the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
or the European Parliament on one side but also to non-political actors like 
critical nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on the other (Beck, 1998, 
pp. 36-40; Giddens, 1998, p. 72). Using new information technologies, shar-
ing their information worldwide, and acting globally, critical NGOs have 
become the new counterpart of the multinational corporations, which have 
appeared as new important players on the stage of the globalized economy. 
Thus, as some scholars argue, the power of controlling and sanctioning cor-
porate (mis)conduct has shifted from nation governments to NGOs which are 
not bound to a national territory and able to create worldwide publicity and to 
organize shaming campaigns, stakeholder protests, and boycotts on a trans-
national level (Crane & Matten, 2007, pp. 428-434; Matten & Crane, 2005; 
also Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 2009, pp. 424-425). 
Nevertheless, this shift does not mean that the global economy is without 
regulation or that nation-states have lost their role in globalizing societies. As 
Hirst and Thompson (2002) point out, “The nation-states, however powerful, 
cannot act alone, whilst nothing can be accomplished without their active 
support, legitimation and funding” (p. 252). Operating in the boundaries of 
national territories, even multinational corporations remain dependent on the 
formal structures of national law, and only the nation-state is able to guaran-
tee the corporation’s status as a legal person and to provide a legal frame, 
where contracts can be concluded, private property is protected, or debts can 
be sued (Brunkhorst, 2005, pp. 133-134). In other words, nation-states are 
not outdated, though they have to re-define their political authority. For Hirst 
and Thompson, this task of “distributing power”—upward to the interna-
tional level and downward to sub-national agencies—remains one of the 
main issues of national policy “that will hold the system of governance 
together” (Hirst & Thompson, 1995, p. 423).
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This issue leads back to the discussion of the responsibilities of the corpo-
rate citoyen and the challenge of political governance. As the authors have 
shown above, without clear regulations for corporate-governmental task-
sharing, corporate engagement will supplant original governmental activities 
but this supplanting will not guarantee that such corporate activities will 
compensate for a lack in governmental services in all relevant areas on a 
sustained basis. Thereby, as Kline (2005) points out, “The danger lies less in 
immediate TNC [Transnational Corporations] involvement to promote spe-
cific goals than in the failure of governments to recognize and to set guide-
lines for such private political action” (p. 30).
To establish rules for corporate-governmental task-sharing, Kline pro-
poses a model defining transnational corporations’ political responsibili-
ties—for example, for the protection of human rights in their host 
countries—by their degree of collaboration with those governments which 
ignore international standards. By doing so, Kline construes a “connection 
continuum” reaching from the directly involved “causal actor” at the one side 
to the “disconnected actor” at the other extreme. Referring to the principle of 
subsidiarity, he argues that in cases where the directly involved transnational 
corporations are unable to solve the problem, the task shifts to the next level, 
the less involved corporations on that continuum (Kline, 2005). In opposite 
to that view, based on a Rawlsian understanding of justice, Hsieh (2004, 
2009) asserts that transnational corporations owe a duty to assist less ordered 
communities to allow them to become “well-ordered societies.” In this con-
text, Hsieh (2009) defines well-ordered societies as societies that secure 
human rights against violations, equipped with a law system, allowing to 
correct market failures and to protect individuals against externalities of the 
economic process, and enabling individuals to influence legislation to secure 
their interests. For profiting from the burdensome conditions in less ordered 
societies, Hsieh concludes, multinational corporations have to take over sec-
ond-order responsibilities for protecting human and workers’ rights and sec-
ond-order obligations for environmental protection if their “well-ordered” 
home countries, which would have been in charge in the first row, are not 
willing or unable to fulfill their duties.
Although both approaches deliver sound reasons why corporations should 
take on positive duties, from a governmental perspective the question remains 
unanswered of how the task-sharing between nation-states and corporations 
as intermediate actors should be organized. Especially Hsieh sees corpora-
tions as a kind of bailsman called to action when nation-states fail. However, 
this conception becomes problematic in cases where lower level entities in 
society accomplish their tasks sufficiently without nation-state assistance. 
Thus, Hsieh (2009) states, “If, for example, industry self-regulation is as 
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effective as relying on regulation by political and legal institutions to avoid 
and mitigate harms, then the argument for promoting well-ordered institu-
tions may no longer apply” (p. 269).
But this argument is precisely about the role of the corporate citoyen in our 
understanding. From a governmental perspective, the corporate citoyen acts 
on an intermediate level. He may define industry-wide standards, introduce 
social or environmental programs below or beyond the nation-state, or col-
laborate with other community members to contribute to the common good 
(Brunkhorst, 2005, p. 133). If something can be accomplished on this lower 
level with higher efficiency or could be done with greater competencies, the 
corporation as lower level layer in society has an obligation to contribute 
according to the tenet of subsidiarity, and as long as the tasks are accom-
plished sufficiently well the state has no right to intervene.
This position is neither a claim for a weak nor for a strong state but rather 
an answer to the question of how nation-states can organize collaboration 
with other layers in society on a sub-governmental level. While Hsieh and 
other authors see corporate civil engagement as necessary in cases where 
governments fail or are unable to provide citizenship services (Hsieh, 2004, 
2009; Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer, Palazzo, & Matten, 2009), we see this 
problem in a more general perspective. Because subsidiarity points in both 
directions, it not only obliges corporations in cases where governments fail, 
but it also requires governmental engagement in cases where lower instances 
fail or are unable to accomplish their own affairs.
Thus, two aspects of subsidiarity have to be considered. From the bottom-
up perspective, subsidiarity requires the accomplishment of the respective 
tasks at the lowest possible level. In other words, intermediate actors have to 
assist citizens if the latter are unable to accomplish societal tasks by their own 
(Lower, 2010, pp. 72-73). This role may include the provision of fundamental 
public goods like health care, support of the elderly, or schooling as well as 
the guarantee of fundamental human rights. This role becomes an even more 
pressing societal duty in the absence of adequate state regulations. Transferred 
to the corporate context, this duty would mean that corporations have to con-
tribute within the limits of their financial means and competences (Aßländer, 
2011). Thus, for example, in the before-mentioned examples, corporations 
could provide health care for their workers, additional pension schemes, edu-
cational programs, or housing, and they can define principles of self-regula-
tion which guarantee fundamental labor or human rights in their sphere of 
influence (Aßländer, 2012, pp. 129-130).
However, this approach does not mean that all social affairs can be regu-
lated on the intermediate level in perpetuity. Public goods like legal security 
or freedom cannot be provided by intermediate corporate actors alone but 
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have to be guaranteed by higher order instances on the national or interna-
tional level (Höffe, 1997). Although, according to the principle of subsidiar-
ity, intermediate actors should regulate their affairs as far as possible by their 
own—which includes the implementation of soft-law standards or commonly 
accepted codes of conduct—this principle does not obviate the need of gov-
ernmental regulations (Brunkhorst, 2005, p. 133). This need raises the ques-
tion of whether lower level instances have an obligation to contribute to the 
establishment of higher order entities if they are unable to accomplish spe-
cific tasks by their own. Although some scholars try to deduce such a duty to 
cooperate in the establishment of higher order instances from the tenet of 
subsidiarity, this deduction is quite problematic. If at all, such duty in litera-
ture is only mentioned as a right of establishing association at the intermedi-
ate level (Lower, 2010, p. 76) and does not address respective duties of the 
intermediate instances to cooperate in the establishment of a functioning 
democratic regime. Hence, the tenet of subsidiarity requires a public author-
ity as highest instance. However, as Lower (2010) argues, such political 
authority “need not be concentrated in discrete national clusters, nor need it 
be concentrated in just one body but could be distributed in a variety of ways” 
(p. 86).
From the top-down perspective, the state’s role is “to co-ordinate the 
activities of the individuals and lesser communities within its jurisdiction 
with a view to creating the social conditions that make it as likely as possible 
that those individuals and communities can each achieve their fulfillment” 
(Lower, 2010, p. 73). In this vein, the nation-state or the community of states 
has to define the scope for activities on the intermediate level. More pre-
cisely, to avoid the arbitrariness of corporate engagement, governmental 
political authorities have to clarify what social tasks have to be accomplished 
by lower order instances and which responsibilities have to be assigned to 
what agencies. In either case, it is the nation-state governments or the com-
munity of states which are the bailsmen if this assignment of responsibilities 
exceeds the possibilities of the respective intermediate actors. Even so, as 
Jellinek (1914) points out, the state can either create better conditions to fos-
ter private engagement or accomplish the respective tasks on its own  
(pp. 259-260). One of the primary tasks of nation-states in globalizing societ-
ies is then to foster and to promote conditions which activate subordinate 
layers in society to collaborate for accomplishing the required goals. This 
task goes far beyond seeing corporate contributions as voluntary philan-
thropic activities. In this conception, corporations, just like other civic orga-
nizations, have a systemic responsibility to actively contribute to the common 
good and it is up to the national and supranational organization to create the 
conditions which would allow for such contributions (Aßländer, 2011).
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However, because the tenet of subsidiarity is more of a regulative idea that 
should guide governmental considerations when assigning responsibilities to 
different layers in society, it is up to the political discourse to decide which 
responsibilities should be assigned to which societal layer in the specific 
case. Although numerous regulations have been enacted on national and 
international level aimed at harmonizing the economic realm of the corporate 
bourgeois, less effort has been made to embed the political activities of the 
corporate citoyen in a coherent political framework. It is worth noting at this 
point that subsidiarity has to be seen as a dynamic principle which also 
includes the possible re-assignment of responsibilities to lower level instances 
(Höffe, 2007, p. 92) and which entails the idea that the assignment of respon-
sibilities might vary from country to country depending on the respective 
cultural and political traditions.
In this context, the “Renewed EU Strategy for Corporate Social 
Responsibility” (European Commission, 2011) provides helpful insights of 
what subsidiarity could mean for political governance in a supranational con-
text. Based on the works of CSR Europe, in 2001 the European Commission 
launched its well-known “Green Paper—Promoting a European Framework 
for Corporate Social Responsibility” and defines CSR as “a concept whereby 
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business oper-
ations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” 
(p. 8). This definition was heavily criticized for at least two reasons. First, it 
offered companies the possibility of summarizing various activities under the 
umbrella of CSR. Second, it remained quite unspecified under which circum-
stances and to which extent corporations must engage with social and environ-
mental issues. To overcome this critique, the commission offered only recently 
a new definition and describes CSR now as “the responsibility of enterprises 
for their impacts on society” (European Commission, 2011, p. 6).
Although even this new definition remains open for various interpreta-
tions, it is quite interesting to see how the commission now tries to motivate 
corporations for engaging in further CSR activities. In this vein, the commis-
sion sees the need “to acknowledge the role that complementary regulation 
plays in creating an environment more conducive to enterprises voluntarily 
meeting their social responsibility” (European Commission, 2011, p. 5). 
Although the commission still holds the view that CSR remains an issue of 
voluntary engagement, it also claims that it is necessary “to better clarify 
what is expected of enterprises” (European Commission, 2011, p. 5). 
Although CSR is seen primarily as a corporate task, “[p]ublic authorities 
should play a supporting role through a smart mix of voluntary policy mea-
sures and, where necessary, complementary regulation . . .” (European 
Commission, 2011, p. 7).
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In its documents, the commission has neither developed systematically the 
idea of subsidiary co-responsibility of corporations nor explicitly mentioned 
subsidiarity as a guiding principle for organizing such corporate-governmen-
tal task-sharing. But we interpret that the way how corporate responsibility 
should be used to resolve environmental and societal problems on the inter-
mediate corporate level approximates the idea of subsidiarity. While in the 
old CSR definition, the commission had focused on voluntariness and the 
business case for CSR (Aßländer, 2011, 2012, pp.122-124), the EU commis-
sion now refers to the political responsibilities of the citoyen rather than to the 
strategic considerations of the corporate bourgeois. It seems that the 
Commission has changed its strategy and now expects contributions from 
corporations in their role as citoyen in return for the protection of the eco-
nomic freedom of the corporations in their role as bourgeois. Hence, the com-
mission adopts the role as an activator and a facilitator for corporate 
engagement in the field of CSR. It is the governments’ task to judge whether 
existing efforts of intermediate instances are a sufficient solution in the 
respective area, or whether further measures have to be taken, and it remains 
up to the governmental agencies—as the commission puts it—to decide, if 
necessary, upon complementary regulations. However, concerning the envis-
aged regulations, the EU document remains rather vague.
Eventually, it remains unclear which “carrot and sticks” can be used to 
foster private engagement on the intermediate corporate level. Indeed, the 
question of how to motivate people to engage for the community is as old as 
political philosophy and has been already addressed in Plato’s politeia. His 
answer to why the most competent citizens should participate in the process 
of political rule-making was as unsatisfactory as simple—because they have 
to fear to be ruled by less competent citizens (Plato, 2008, 347c).
Apart from the traditional incentive schemes, like tax reduction or subsi-
dies, or coercive means, like legal provisions, governments could create new 
space for maneuver in specific fields which are vital for both corporations 
and communities, and they could set standards which assure that corporate 
engagement does not only serve corporate interests but also meets the expec-
tation of the community. Possible arrays for such engagement could be edu-
cation, health and safety, or waste prevention or energy saving. Another step 
in this direction would be to acknowledge the existing regulatory efforts of 
corporations, that is, to enhance the status of soft-law regulations. The EU 
commission could verify whether and to what extent existing standards ful-
fill the expectations of the community and if they are in line with interna-
tional norms of behavior. This kind of orchestration of soft-law and legal 
regulations would not obviate the need of governmental regulations but cre-
ate room for assuming subsidiary co-responsibilities on the intermediate 
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level. If soft-law regulations prove to be insufficient, such an assignment of 
competencies can be withdrawn by state authorities. Furthermore, soft-law 
standards need not necessarily to be without democratic legitimization. For 
instance, the newly developed ISO 26000 standard results from a multi-
stakeholder dialogue which has included different interest groups in society 
from various countries and claims to be based on international consent.
Thus, the authors assert that corporate-governmental task-sharing could 
work in a similar way at a global level. Defined by its industrial belonging, 
the corporate citoyens may collaborate in developing industry-wide social or 
environmental standards, establish monitoring agencies which control issues 
such as production safety, human rights, work safety, and so on. If these stan-
dards will not violate national law and the control mechanisms are efficient, 
there is no reason why states should not accept the industry standard as part 
of its national regulations, especially in cases where the competencies lay at 
industry level or where such standards can be enforced by companies them-
selves more efficiently. This interpretation implies that (supra-)national gov-
ernmental institutions may acknowledge self-regulation of societal or 
environmental issues—when designed and implemented in an appropriate 
manner—as an effective means of ensuring responsible business conduct.
Nevertheless, the question remains how far such subsidiary co-responsi-
bilities should reach. Although corporations may contribute significantly to 
solve societal problems, their capabilities are limited. Subsidiarity is based 
also on an idea of efficiency which means that tasks should be accomplished 
at that level in society where action can be done less costly, with greater com-
petences or better efficacy. But it cannot be expected from corporations that 
they tackle all societal problems existing in modern society.
Discussion and Conclusion
In the preceding paragraphs, the authors have analyzed two important aspects 
of CC, discussing the status of citizenship and clarifying the mode of corpo-
rate citizens’ contribution to society. Furthermore, we have asked how the idea 
of CC might be connected with the established structures of political gover-
nance. We believe that our conceptual framework allows a better understand-
ing of what constitutes CC from a political point of view. To explain what the 
term CC should mean, the authors have differentiated two spheres of citizen-
ship that could be addressed, the corporate bourgeois and the corporate 
citoyen. The status of the corporate bourgeois is defined by external govern-
mental authority and reduced to private business purposes. The corporate 
bourgeois operates under rules defined by (national) governments, which 
guarantee legal certainty and freedom for their subjects’ private economic 
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activities. In contrast, the corporate citoyen is part of a specific socio-political 
community, defined by his national, multilocal, or industrial belonging 
(Aßländer & Curbach, 2014). He plays an active role in shaping the political 
and social order and takes on responsibilities for others and for the common 
good. As intermediate actor in society he bears subsidiary co-responsibilities 
to accomplish respective tasks in those areas in which he has specific compe-
tencies and in which the accomplishment can be done on this level more effi-
ciently or with greater effects for the community (Aßländer, 2011). However, 
he remains subordinate under political and legal regulations. Therefore gov-
ernments are called to develop adequate governance structures, which would 
allow for integrating the political responsibilities of the corporate citoyen.
In our opinion, the factual engagement of corporations as providers of citi-
zenship rights should not be seen as a new role of corporations as quasi-gov-
ernmental actors (Matten & Crane, 2005; Moon et al., 2005), but as an 
evolving self-conception of the corporate citizen from bourgeois to citoyen 
(Aßländer & Curbach, 2014). This development has to be mirrored also by a 
co-development of political regulations. While much effort has been made to 
harmonize international regulations concerning the legal protection of the cor-
porate bourgeois, only few attempts have been made to embed the corporation 
as a political citizen in the political order. Therefore, we have introduced the 
tenet of subsidiarity, which provides a regulatory idea of how corporate-gov-
ernmental task-sharing could be organized from a governmental perspective. 
To illustrate how the principle of subsidiarity could be used in the context of 
political governance, we have referred to the example of the new EU Strategy 
for Corporate Social Responsibility (European Commission, 2011).
However, the new CSR strategy of the EU must be seen only as a first 
tentative attempt to embed societal activities of corporations in a broader 
political context. If subsidiarity as a principle of corporate-governmental col-
laboration is taken seriously, governments as well as supranational organiza-
tions such as the EU have to identify new fields for CSR activities of 
corporations which go beyond the expectation of voluntary corporate philan-
thropic engagement. Furthermore, new governance structures and monitor-
ing instruments have to be developed which are capable to cope with the new 
role of corporations as political actors and ensure that corporate engagement 
also contributes to the common good of the (global) community.
The tenet of subsidiarity as principle of political governance also has strict 
limitations in cases of not-existing or weak governments. The underlying 
assumption of subsidiarity is that there exists at least a minimalistic national 
or international political order (Lower, 2010, pp. 86-87; see Höffe, 1997). 
Only when this assumption applies, there may be a clear duty of assistance 
for higher authorities in society if lower entities are in need (Gosepath, 2005, 
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p. 162; von Nell-Breuning, 1964, p. 8; von Nell-Breuning, 1968, pp. 60-61). 
Although this duty does not release intermediate societal layers from their 
responsibilities in the absence of such order, the tenet of subsidiarity gives 
only little advice concerning the co-responsibilities and liabilities of interme-
diate instances for the establishment of a functioning democratic regime. 
Because the introduction of the tenet of subsidiarity as a principle of political 
governance was originally intended to defend individuals against exuberant 
state regulations (Höffe, 1997), it refers to the nation-state as a matter of fact. 
More scholarly work has to be done to clarify the role of intermediate 
instances in society in establishing a democratic order where there is no func-
tioning state government.
Although the authors believe that subsidiarity provides helpful insights 
which allow for structuring corporate-governmental task-sharing and gives 
advice on how public–private collaboration can be embedded in the process 
of political governance, it only provides an analytical frame without norma-
tive implications. If corporations are bestowed not only with legal person-
hood but also with a kind of political autonomy as citizens, future research is 
required to clarify the legal and political consequences of such a new under-
standing. Therefore, a normative basis has to be developed within the politi-
cal process itself to define the respective rights and duties of the corporate 
citoyen concerning the establishment of a democratic order. This normative 
basis will also lead to a new discussion about the rights, duties, and limits of 
political participation of corporate citizens in general.
Last but not least, if the corporate citoyen is defined as a political actor 
who bears subsidiary co-responsibilities in society, he is also responsible for 
defining his own standards of behavior. Hence, the question arises of how 
such soft-law standards have to be embedded in the system of national juris-
diction. As shown above, we see this argument as a tentative first step to 
acknowledge the autonomy of the corporation as citoyen. However, future 
research has to clarify the status of industry regulations from a governmental 
perspective and to develop ideas for procedures of how to integrate them in 
the legal system.
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